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DUAL CITIZENSIDP AND FORCED MARRIAGES
ALISON SYMINGTONt

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the phenomenon of forced maiTiage and how
the international law on diplomatic protection and domestic citizenship
laws interact to prevent young women from receiving help because of
their status as dual nationals. The evolution of international law and the
rise of human rights are considered, the author contesting international
rules preventing the United Kingdom from attempting to assist its nationals who are abducted to South Asia for the purposes of forced
marriage. This paper demonstrates how in complex situations involving
power, gender, culture and politics, law is better understood as a struggle
over meaning than as a stated rule of practice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Citizenship is frequently approached as a theoretical or philosophical topic. Membership criteria and community boundaries are debated
and revised with much enthusiasm. Citizenship, however, can have
many tangible implications for individuals. In the most extreme situations, the physical and material well-being of people can depend on their
citizenship status and the interactions between immigration and citizenship laws. In such circumstances, the theory of citizenship becomes
critically important in a practical sense.
This paper presents one such situation, where the liberty and security
of individuals is threatened but the interaction of citizenship laws and
nationality rules prevents them from receiving help. Young women are
abducted and forced into marriages while their status as dual nationals
t Alison Symington recently completed an LL.B. at the University of Toronto. She would
like to thank Sara Hossain, Interights, and Karen Knop for their advice and support in this
research project, which grew. out of an internship at Interights (South Asia Program). The
internship was partially funded by the University of Toronto Human Rights Program.
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prevents authorities from helping them escape. This paper will connect
the international law on diplomatic protection with domestic citizenship
provisions in a way that accords with contemporary notions of justice
and human rights in an attempt to problematize "rules" and develop an
appreciation for the lived reality of legal theory.
In the first section of the paper, the problem of forced marriages
within the British-Asian community will be discussed, as reported in the
work of three non-governmental organizations active in women's rights
protection. Section two will canvass the evolving treatment of dual
citizenship and section three will discuss diplomatic protection of dual
nationals. Four arguments regarding the international rules of diplomatic protection for dual nationals will be presented and an argument
will be made for a reconceptualization of the meaning of citizenship and
protection in accordance with contemporary values of individual human
rights. Ultimately, the paper highlights the interactions of citizenship
and nationality domestically and internationally, demonstrating the
complexity and inadequacy of legal rules in the face of real life crises.

II. FORCED MARRIAGES
To explore issues of dual nationality, membership and protection, I
will be using as a backdrop the abduction of women for the purpose of
forced marriage, a situation of recent concern in Britain and South Asia.
The British Home Office Minister for Conmmnity Relations, Mike
0 'Brien, has established a working group to investigate and make
recommendations to tackle the issue. 1 Much of the description presented in this paper is based on a submission made to the working group
on behalf of INTERIGHTS (an international human rights law centre
based in London, England), Ain o Salish Kendra [ASK] (a legal aid and
human rights centre based in Dhaka, Bangladesh), Shirkat Gah (a
women's resource centre based in Lahore, Pakistan) and research conducted by others in support of the work of these three Non Governmental Organisations. This example provides a challenging situation against
which to test theoretical presumptions and to demonstrate the interplay
of domestic policy and international law relating to citizenship and/or
1

See R. Ford, "Asian Peers will Lead Inquiry on Forced Marriage" The [London} Times (4
August 1999); "Oh Yes You Do" The [London] Guardian (16 August 1999).
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nationality. I will not be addressing constitutional, human rights, immigration, criminal or civil liability issues involved in this situation.
The tenn 'forced marriage' refers to any marriage conducted without
the valid consent of both parties. Arranged marriages, on the other hand,
may be freely consented to by both parties and are not the subject of this
paper. Forced marriage occurs within diverse cultures, traditions, nationalities and religions. Their incidence in the United Kingdom (U.K.)
is highest amongst Hindu, Muslim and Sikh women in the Bangladeshi,
Indian and Pakistani communities. 2 It may involve coercion, mental
abuse, intense family or social pressure, even physical violence, abduction, detention or murder. Although the victims can be either men or
women, most reported cases involve young women or girls, and the
woman's immediate family members (father, mother, or siblings) are
usually directly responsible. 3
As explained in the submission to the working group, each situation
is unique but typically a young woman or girl is induced by her immediate family to travel to South Asia, ostensibly for a holiday or to visit an
ailing relative. She then fails to return to the U.K. as scheduled and loses
contact with her friends, classmates or colleagues. 4 On arrival in the
receiving count1y, she is taken to her family's home, usually in a remote,
rural and often highly conservative area. Shortly thereafter she becomes
aware that arrangements are being made for her marriage. 5
Frequently, the woman is held in effective detention; she may be
prevented from leaving the home unescorted, have little access to any
means of external communication, and her passport may be taken from
her. Even if she were able to leave the house, her presence outside, in
areas where women rarely travel alone, would be highly conspicuous
and entail a serious risk of violence; her lack of familiarity with the local
2

Submission by The International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights
(INTERIGHTS), Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) and Shirkat Gah to the Home Office Working
Group, Information Gathering Exercise on Forced Marriages, March 2000 at I [on file with
author; hereinafter Submission]. The discussion in the Submission focuses on the more
extreme cases of forced marriage, involving abduction from the United Kingdom, and concerns Muslim women from within the Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities in the United
Kingdom, many of whom are dual nationals (of the United Kingdom and the receiving
country).
3 Ibid. at 1-2.
4
Submission, supra note 2 at 2.
5 Submission, supra note 2.
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language and society further impedes her independence. In extreme
cases, she may be subjected to physical and/or mental abuse. 6
The woman may be able to smuggle out a message for help, to a
friend, fiance or boyfriend in the U .K. This person may then contact the
U.K. authorities (e.g. the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Members
of Parliament, police, a teacher) or U.K.-based voluntary organizations
for assistance. They may then be referred to the British High Commission in Bangladesh or Pakistan, and in tum, to local human rights or
women's organizations, or lawyers. 7
The organizations that intervene may try to locate the woman,
contact her, and arrange for her to reach the British High Commission. If
the woman is able to reach the High Commission, she may receive help
from the consular officials. She may be interviewed separately from her
family, advised of her rights, and provided with access to a lawyer and
may also be provided with shelter, emergency travel documents and a
safe escort to the airport. 8
British newspapers and magazines have reported numerous personal
accounts in recent years of British teenagers who have been deceived by
their families, taken away from their homes and their friends and held
against their wishes. Sometimes these women have suffered physical
and mental violence including rape, and have been forced into marriage
relationships without their consent. 9 These stories may include heroic
rescues, tales of murder or tell of young couples on the run from private
detectives hired by their families. It is estimated that at least 1,000
young British-Asian women a year are forced into ma1Tiages against
their wishes in the British Asian community of approximately onemillion.10 Moreover, the British Foreign Office reports that it deals with

6

Submission, supra note 2.
Submission, supra note 2.
8
Submission, supra note 2 at 2-3.
9
See for example C. Sarler, "The Vanishing Girls" The [London} Observer (1996) 11; S.
Boggan, "Bounty Hunters Tail Rlmaway Brides" The [London] Independent (20 July 1998) 3;
F. Bodi, "The Case of Reluctant Brides" The [London] Guardian ( 15 Januaiy 1999); M.
Wainwright, "Love Survives the Most Delicate Generation Game" The [London] Guardian
(27 May 1999) 9; N. Watt, "Terror of Couple Fleeing a Forced Marriage" The [London]
Guardian (27 May 1999) 9; L. Ward, "East Side St01y" The [London] Guardian (7 June 1999)
7

7.
10 D. Hencke, "Focus on Forced Asian Marriages" The [London} Guardian, (5 August
1999); Ford, supra note 1.
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"around two people forced into marriage every week." 11 Lawyers, activists, women's groups, and government officials are attempting to find
solutions.
How does this scenario provide a useful means to explore the
meaning of membership and protection in modem society? In particular,
what does the practice of forced marriages tell us about dual citizenship?
Many of the women abducted from Britain and forced into marriages
have dual citizenship or nationality; they are considered to be both
British citizens and citizens of the ancestral country of their family.
Since they are British citizens, many of these women and the people
trying to help them escape from their ordeal tum to the British authorities for assistance. Under international human rights law, Britain has an
obligation to protect these women. In addition, under public international law, states have the right to the diplomatic protection of their
nationals abroad. As mentioned above, the British High Commission
has helped victims in various ways. The British government, however,
has made it clear that there are limits to the consular protection that dual
nationals enjoy while in the state of their second nationality and that the
British Government cannot intervene officially in the event of a dispute.
This inability or refusal to intervene is the "plot-twist" which will be
explored in the remainder of this paper.

III. THE MEANING OF CITIZENSHIP:
ONE'S LINK WITH THE STATE
Citizenship and nationality are closely connected legal concepts and
although they are frequently used interchangeably, they refer to two
different aspects of membership in a state. Nationality signifies membership in a state vis-a-vis other states and stresses the international
protections afforded by membership. Citizenship, on the other hand,
refers to full membership within the state, especially the possession of
full political rights. 12 One of the themes underlying the abduction of
"Britain Tackles Forced MmTiages", The Associated Press (3 March 2000).
Committee on Feminism and International Law, International Law Association,
Women's Equality and Nationality in International Law (Taipei: Preliminary Report, May
1998) at 7.
11

12
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British-Asian women is the interrelationship of citizenship and nationality and the domestic and the international aspects of membership and
protection. In this section, citizenship and nationality will be discussed
as two expressions of the same status.
A common motif of the models and theories of citizenship and
nationality is a bond of mutual loyalty between the citizen and the state
or community. This bond has different dimensions. First, citizenship or
nationality is the legal status of an individual's formal membership in a
state. This membership is acquired and lost according to the state's mies
and serves as the basis for the member's rights and duties. 13 Second,
citizenship is a crucial political status. In the modem international
political system, geographic borders delimit territory and citizenship or
nationality laws delimit people. In this world configuration, citizenship
has significance far beyond fo1mal legal membership; it invo]ves loyalty
to the state, its principles of government and its basic values. 14 Third,
citizenship impmis a social and cultural meaning of membership in a
national or cultural group. Finally, the psychological dimension of
citizenship and nationality expresses a personal sense of belonging to
the larger c01mnunity15 or individual identification. Thus, the bond of
citizenship can be complex and can have different meanings.
The link of an individual with a state is generally conceived of as a
mutual relationship which confers rights and imposes obligations. 16
Domestically, for example, citizenship allows a citizen to eajoy the
protection of national laws and the benefits of state-funded social services. Citizens also have rights of political pa1iicipation, such as voting.
The citizen is subject to domestic laws and regulations, and may have
duties to the state such as a duty to perfonn milita1y service.
At the international level, nationality also delineates rights and
obligations by linking individuals with states. For example, customaiy
international law prohibits a state from excluding or deporting its nationals. States also issue passports to their nationals to facilitate foreign
13
T. Hanunar, "State, Nation, and Dual Citizenship" in W. Brubaker, ed., Immigration and
the Politics of Citi::enship in Europe and North America (New York: University Press of
America, 1989) 81 at 85.
14
Ibid.
15
Hammar, supra note 13.
16
P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law (Gemrnntown, Md.: Sijthoff
& Noordhoff, 1979) at 30.
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travel. 17 In addition, states have a duty to admit their nationals and allow
them to reside within their territory. 18 This may include a duty to
perform military service. The individual is also subject to the jurisdiction of their national state for criminal acts committed abroad. 19
Traditionally states are the subjects of public international law and
individuals are protected under international law only by their link to a
state through nationality. 20 Nationality thereby grants the state standing
to make a diplomatic claim of harm to one of its nationals. 21 Thus
diplomatic protection is a means to demand a remedy at international
law when international standards for the treatment of foreign nationals
have been violated. However, unlike human rights law, there is no
obligation for a state to act - it protects its own interests entirely at its
discretion. 22
These discretionary diplomatic protections and consular functions
are governed by the common law, customary international law and
several international treaties. 23 As mentioned above, the state has a
discretionary right to protect its citizens. The citizen, however, does not
have a right to protection. 24 The most fundamental aspect of diplomatic
protection at the international level is the right for a state to bring a claim

17

S. Legomsky, "Why Citizenship?" (1994) 35 Va. J. Int'! L. 279 at 298.
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/811, art. 13(2); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 12(4); Aji-ican Charter on
Human and People's Rights (Banjul Charter) (1982) 21 I.L.M. 58, art. 12(2); and Protocol
No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
E.T.S. no. 46, art. 3.
19
Supra note 17.
20
Notably, development such as individual complaints mechanisms for human rights
violations are changing this.
21
Supra note 12 at 6. To confer international protection on its citizens is a right ofa state at
customary international law. The potential accordance of international protection is considered an essential element of national status. Evidence of this importance can be fotmd in the
fact that people who are not accorded protection, such as refugees, are considered together
with stateless people for some purposes. See supra note 16 at 33-4, 44.
22
G. Leigh, "Nationality and Diplomatic Protection" (1971) 20 I.C.L.Q. 453 at 455.
23
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, 1963 in L. Lee, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations : With Text and
Commentaries (A.W. Sijthoff-Leyden, 1966) and European Convention on Consular Functions, (1967) ETS No. 61, online: Council of Europe <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/
cadreprincipal.htm> (date accessed: 31 August 2001 ).
24
Citi=enship: The White Paper identifies the right to diplomatic protection as a hallmark
of citizenship since a degree of physical security and material well-being is an essential
18
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to an international tribunal on behalf of one of its nationals whose rights
have been violated by another state. Consular officials can also offer
very important assistance to citizens abroad, such as contacting family
and friends for assistance; atTanging medical help; providing comfort
and assisting victims of violence; providing assistance in dealing with a
criminal justice system; assisting in the location of missing persons;
helping locate .abducted children and reuniting them with custodial
parents; replacing passports; and legalizing documents. 25
The protection that a state can offer to its nationals is very imp01iant
to British women who are abducted for the purposes of forced marriages. Without assistance in obtaining emergency travel documents,
speaking to lawyers and non-governmental organizations, conununicating with friends or family in Britain, as well as guidance on local
practices and assistance in getting to the airport, these women may not
be able to escape and return to Britain. Diplomatic and consular services
are therefore critical to abducted women. This aspect of international
protection provided by nationality may be limited for those who are
considered nationals of more than one state, which can be both devastating and dangerous.

precondition for meaningful or effective political participation by citizen. British citizens have
a right to protection at common law, as evidenced by statute, although this right does not
extend to diplomatic protection abroad. J.P. Gardner, ed., Citi=enship: The White Paper (The
Institute for Citizenship Studies and The British Institute of International and Comparative
Law, 1997) at 70, 78.
25
"Who We Are and What We Do", online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade <http://www.voyage.gc.ca/Consular-e/About_Us/who_what-e.htm> (date accessed: 31 August 200 l ). The help that British consular officials can and cannot provide to
their nationals abroad has been set out in a similar leaflet. It states that the Btitish Consul can,
inter alia: issue emergency passports, contact relatives and friends and ask for their help in
providing money and tickets, on certain criteria provide a loan to get back to the U.K., and
help get the national in touch with local lawyers, interpreters and doctors. The Consul may
also visit any person who has been affested or put in prison and, in certain circumstances,
affange for messages to be sent to relatives or friends, give guidance on organizations
experienced in tracing missing persons, and in certain circumstances speak to local authorities.
"British Consular Services ", online: Foreign & Commonwealth Office <http://
www.fco.gov.uk/travel/dynpage.asp?Page=437> (date accessed: 31 August 2001 ).
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IV. MULTIPLE STATUSES
If citizenship and nationality imply full membership within a community and a special link to a state, what is dual or multiple nationality?
Is the significance of this relationship undennined if it is not exclusive?
How can the rights and duties associated with citizenship be implemented if they are owed to more than one state? Multiple citizenship has
traditionally been strongly resisted and seen as antithetical to a sovereign state's interests. In recent years, however, there has been a growing
tolerance of dual nationality and even, in some instances, a recognition
that multiple citizenship can be consistent with state and individual
interests. In this section I will examine the phenomenon of dual citizenship, briefly review the resistance of some states to dual nationality and
provide evidence of a growing tolerance towards multiple nationalities
in the globalizing, post-national world of human rights where national
boundaries are of diminishing importance and the rights of individuals,
groups and transnational organizations are increasingly powerful.
Dual nationality arises when circumstances place an individual
within the scope of the nationality law of two or more states. There are
three primary situations in which individuals acquire more than one
nationality:
a) many gender-neutral citizenship laws permit the transmission
of citizenship through both maternal and paternal filiations,
thus children of mixed-nationality marriages may inherit both
the mother's and the father's citizenship;

b) children born to foreign parents injus soli countries will have
one citizenship attributed to them by jus soli and another by jus
sanguinis26 ; and
c) whenever the acquisition of a new citizenship (e.g. through
naturalization) is not accompanied by renunciation or automatic expatriation of the original citizenship, the individual
will have more than one citizenship. 27

The two principles on which nationality is awarded at bitih arejus soli andjus sanguinis.
The jus sanguinis principle detennines nationality by descent or origin. The jus soli principle
allows a child to be a national of the state in which they were bom, in-espective of the parents'
nationalities. The vast majority of states have adopted an approach that combines the two
principles. Supra note 11, at 10.
26
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Despite efforts to limit multiple nationalities, recent changes in nationality laws such as eliminating gender discrimination and removing requirements to renounce former citizenship when one naturalizes have
increased the number of people of multiple nationalities. 28 In the British-Asian forced marriage example, the dual citizenship status results
fromjus soli andjus sanguinis principles which each assign a different
citizenship to the victim. 29
The outcome of each of these three situations is dictated by the
nation's laws, which include principles of }us soli or jus sanguinis and
naturalization procedures, which are affected by principles of international law such as equality and rules of nationality and state succession
only indirectly. Thus citizenship is governed by national rules of the
sovereign state and not dictated by international law. These national
laws, however, interact with one another and have ramifications on the
international plane.
The tribunal decisions and international conventions that will be
discussed in the following sections address the international implications of nationality and do not evaluate domestic rules. 30 The distinctions between nationality and citizenship, international reCOf:,'11ition and
domestic status blur and in most instances one's nationality coincides
with their citizenship. The interplay between citizenship and nationality
is often overlooked. It should be acknowledged, however, that this
interaction is the source of much of the complication and conflict
associated with nationality and citizenship, particularly when individuals with dual or multiple statuses are involved.
1. Resistance to Multiple Nationalities
In his extensive 1961 work on dual nationality, Bar-Yaacov states
that "[i]t is a widely held opinion that dual nationality is an undesirable
27 W. Brnbaker, "Citizenship and Naturalization: Policies and Politics" in Brnbaker, supra
note 17 at 115.
28
Supra note 12 at 81-2.
29
Under the Citi::enship Act of 1951, which obtains in both Pakistan and Bangladesh, the
children of Pakistani or Bangladeshi fathers are deemed to be nationals. This means that, for
example, a woman born in the United Kingdom to a Pakistani father would be considered both
a citizen of the United Kingdom under their }us soli provisions and a citizen of Pakistan under
their }us sanguinis provisions. Without desiring dual status, and maybe even without knowing
it, she becomes a dual citizen.
3
For example, see: Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955] I.CJ. Rep. 4 at 20-1.

°
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phenomenon detrimental both to the friendly relations between nations
and the well-being of individuals concerned."31 Indeed, the widely held
antipathy to multiple citizenships or nationalities was evident in both
domestic legislation and international agreements. According to Canadian law in effect until 1977, for example, a Canadian citizen who
acquired a foreign nationality automatically lost his or her Canadian
citizenship instead of becoming a dual national. 32 Similarly, the First
Conference for Codification of International Law, held at The Hague in
1930, devoted a committee to issues of nationality whose purpose in
codifying the law of nationality was to reduce, if not abolish, statelessness and multiple nationality. 33
As Bar-Yaacov suggests, the general aversion towards dual citizenship was rooted in a concern for preventing disputes between nations
and avoiding a perception of conflicting loyalties. 34 First, by invoking
the protection of one state against the other, the dual national would
prompt disputes between two nations. This possibility was seen as both
an embarrassment to the state and as posing a danger to the international
community as a whole. 35 Second, multiple allegiances were seen as an
impossibility. A dual national would have difficulty fulfilling his or her
duties owed to two different states (e.g. military service) Thus it was
feared that citizens would not fulfill their obligations at all. Furthermore,
31

N. Bar-Yaacov, Dual Nationality (London: Stevens & Sons, 1961) at 4.
"Dual Citizenship" pamphlet, online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada <http://
cic.gc.ca/english/citizen/dualci_e.html> (date accessed: 31 August 2001 ).
33
M. Hudson, "The First Conference for the Codification of International Law" ( 1930) 24
A.J.I.L. 447 at 450. The Preamble to the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws, produced at this Conference reads in part:
Being Convinced that it is in the general interest of the international
community to secure that all its members should recognize that every
person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only;
Recognizing accordingly that the ideal towards which the effo1is of humanity should be directed in this domain is the abolition of all cases both
of statelessness and double nationality;
34
In the words of Captain David Gordon: "The dual national is frequently both an
embarrassment and a problem for both himself and his govenunents, for he is a man of
divided, and often conflicting, loyalties and duties. He owes allegiance to two govenunents,
two legal systems, two political systems, and two cultures. When these two worlds are in
conflict, the dual national is frequently caught in the middle" ("Dual Nationality and the
United States Citizen" (1983) 102 Mil. L. Rev. 181).
35
P. Spiro, "Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship" (1997) 46 Emory L.J. 1411
at 1432.
32
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on a conceptual level, the idea that a person could have more than one
nationality threatened the integrity of the principle of citizenship and
state sovereignty. 36 Multiple allegiances were also perceived as causing
a psychological dilemma and hardship for the dual national themselves. 37 Given the numerous aspects of citizenship, discussed above, it
was inconceivable that an individual could have that close bond with
more than one state, particularly in a world perpetually poised on the
verge of war.
2. A Growing Tolerance
The aversion to dual nationality remains, but there is abundant
evidence that it is becoming more acceptable. 38 The international context has changed so that dual nationals are not perceived as posing a
threat. The problem of dual nationality is now seen more as one of coordination. The opponents of dual nationality often exaggerate the complications of dual nationality, relying on a conception of a well-ordered
international world which does not exist. 39 Specific problems such as
conflicting military obligations have been addressed by international
agreements40 and bilateral treaties have been negotiated to resolve conflicts between states.41 Furthennore, it is increasingly recognized that
36
For example, the United States Delegate to the 1930 Conference for the Codification of
International Law states that:
The question of the status and rights of naturalized citizens is necessarily
most impotiant to our country and to all the newer countries of the world,
since our population is composed so largely of naturalized citizens or their
descendants. As I have already stated on a previous occasion, if the
nationality and the allegiance of such persons is limited or divided, we can
have no true body of citizenship. We consider that naturalization means a
complete change in the national character of the individual. ... "
Quoted in R. Flournoy Jr., "Nationality Convention, Protocols and Recommendations
Adopted by the First Conference on the Codification of International Law" (1930) 24 A.J.I.L.
467 at 473-4.
37 Supra note 31 at 4-5.
38
S. Tan, "Dual Nationality in France and the United States" (1992) 15 Hastings Int'! &
Comp. L. Rev. 447 at 458; supra note 35 at 1453.
39
Supra note 12 at 86-7.
40
e.g. Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military
Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, 6 May 1963, E.T.S. No. 43, online: Council of
Europe <http://conventions.coe.intffreaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm> (date accessed: 31 August 2001).
41
See L. Lee, Consular Law and Practice, 211<1 ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991) at 157, n. 129.
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multiple loyalties are neither unusual nor improper. Dual citizenship
corresponds well with the multiple social and cultural identifications of
many immigrants, internationally mobile persons and families of mixed
ancestry. Dual citizenship provides formal recognition of the social fact
of dual identification that is experienced by many citizens and accepting
multiple nationalities is therefore seen as a positive development by
some commentators. 42
The changing attitude can be found, for example, in European
conventions relating to nationality. The 1963 Convention on Reduction
of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of
Multiple Nationality, as the name implies, sets out criteria to limit
individuals to single nationalities in most situations, noting in the preamble that "cases of multiple nationality are liable to cause difficulties
and that joint action to reduce as far as possible the number of cases of
multiple nationality, as between member States, corresponds to the aims
of the Council of Europe.''43 The 1993 Second Protocol amending this
Convention, however, is more accommodating of multiple citizenship.
The preamble states:
Considering the large number of migrants who have settled permanently in the member States of the Council of Europe and the need to
complete their integration, particularly in the case of second-generation migrants, in the host State, through the acquisition of the nationality of that State;
Considering the large number of mixed marriages in member States
and the need to facilitate acquisition by one spouse of the nationality

42
Supra note 12 at 89-90. In Resolution 5/2000 of the International Law Association
(Committee on Feminism and International Law) it is suggested that when a family lives in a
state where not all of the family members are nationals, the state should recognize the right of
each spouse or partner to acquire the nationality of the other without loosing his or her own
nationality, and that the children should be able to acquire and keep the nationality of both
parents. Paragraph 5, Resolution 5/2000, 69'h Conference of the International Law Association (London, 2000), "Feminism and International Law", online: International Law Association <http://www.ila-hq.org> (date accessed: 31 August 2001) [hereinafter Conference].
43
Supra note 40. Article I provides that:
1. Nationals of the Contracting Parties who are of foll age and who
acquire of their own free will, by means of naturalisation, option or
recovery, the nationality of another Party shall lose their fonner
nationality. They shall not be authorised to retain their fonner nationality.
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of the other spouse and the acquisition by their children of the nationality of both parents, in order to encourage unity of nationality within
the same family;
Considering that conservation of nationality of origin is an important
factor in achieving these objectives, ... 44

The Protocol then amends the provisions of the Convention to allow
individuals to maintain more than one citizenship.
Finally, the 1997 European Convention on Nationality acknowledges the varied approaches of States to questions of multiple nationality and the desirability of finding appropriate solutions to the problems
of coordination that result. Chapter V of the Convention explicitly
permits multiple nationality and provides full rights to dual nationals. 45
These successive conventions illustrate the general changing attitude
towards dual and multiple citizenship. While for the most part each
state's policy is considered an internal matter, increasingly multiple
citizenship is being treated as a problem of international coordination
which can be addressed without requiring the renunciation of other
nationalities, as illustrated by recent European trends.
It is worth noting that the right to a nationality is now recognized as
an international human right.46 It is considered both a basic right and a

+i Second Protocol Amending the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple
Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, ETS No. 149, online:
Council of Europe <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm> (date accessed:
31 August 2001).
45
European Convention on Nationality, ETS No. 166, online: Council of Europe <http://
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htrn> (date accessed: 31 August 2001). Article
14 provides:
l. State Party shall allow:
(a) children having different nationalities acquired automatically at birth
to retain these nationalities;
(b) its nationals to possess another nationality where this other nationality
is automatically acquired by marriage.
46
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15:
(I) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
(2) No one shall be deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
See J. Chan, "The Right to a Nationality as Human Right" (1991) 12 H.R.L.J. I; C. Bachelor
"Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status", (1998) 10 Int'! J. of Refogee
Law 156 for commentary on the development of the right to a nationality.
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precursor to the exercise of other rights. 47 While there is no human right
to dual nationality nor even a human right to the nationality of one's
choice, I argue that as the content of the right to a nationality is
developed, the tolerance of multiple statuses will increase. For example,
as international human rights law grows to protect an individual's
interest in their attachment to a state and the rights inherent in this
attachment, states will be less able to convincingly argue that divided
loyalties or the inconveniences of coordinating multiples statuses are
sufficient reason to deny someone citizenship, even if they are already a
citizen of another state. In this way , the rise of international human
rights principles is influencing both principles of public international
law and traditional areas of sovereign state authority.
Ironically perhaps, the growing tolerance towards multiple nationalities which is seen as an advancement in a rights-based, globalized
world, is used as a reason by the U.K. authorities to deny protection to
British-Asian women. The tensions created by the increasing acceptance
of dual nationalities, its importance for women forced into marriage and
the uncertainty surrounding the "rules" of dual citizenship leads to a
legal lacuna.

V. DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION
As mentioned above, diplomatic protection has long been considered a hallmark of nationality status48 and it has proved critical in
rescuing women and girls abducted for the purposes of forcing them into
marriages. Diplomatic protection also poses one of the key challenges to
dual nationality - by invoking the protection of one state against the
other, the dual national can cause embarrassment and conflicts between
the two states. One solution to this conflict is to categorically refuse
protection to nationals from events in a state in which they also hold
nationality. This is the "rule" which the United Kingdom has referred to
47
See for example Bachelor, ibid. describing nationality the special relationship between
the individual and the State through which the individual becomes a participant in society and
assumes an identity under law. Nationality has been described as "the tight to have rights" and
thus one of the most important rights that a state can assign to individuals; Conference, supra
note 42 at I 0.
48
Supra note 16 at 44.
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when pressed to aid British-Asia women abducted to Bangladesh and
Pakistan for forced marriages.
In a recent statement, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs stated that the U.K. Government's position in such cases is based
on international law, not domestic policy:
Dual nationality is not a policy of the British Government. It is not
anything over which we even have any control. Under international
law, we do not have any fonnal right of consular protection over
people who have both British and another nationality in the country of
their second nationality. 49

The rule of international law referred to in this statement is articulated in Article 4 of the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws, 50 which provides that: "A state may not
afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a state whose
nationality such person also possesses."
This rule, however, is not universally applicable and its enforcement
has led to two divergent schools of thought on diplomatic protection and
dual nationals. In this section I will discuss the legal basis and reasoning
of each school of thought, demonstrating that the rule to which the
Under-Secretary refers may not actually govern Britain's ability to
intervene on behalf of abducted British-Asian citizens.
Article 4 of the Nationality Convention is referred to as "the rule of
sovereign equality" or "the rule of state non-responsibility". It is based
on the idea that the ordering of persons and assets is an aspect of the
domestic jurisdiction of a state and integral to sovereignty and independence. Thus a second state interferes in the first state's domestic affairs
if it offers diplomatic protection to a citizen of that state. Therefore,
while a dual national is in one of their states of nationality, that nationality operates as if it was their only nationality. Furthennore, it is reasoned
that if both nationalities are valid, to pennit one state to represent the
individual against the other state would give greater effect to the nationality of the claimant state, thus denying sovereign equality. 51

49

Speech by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Baroness Scotland of Asthal Q.C., at the Family Proceedings Conference, Leeds, 3 March
2000, as quoted in supra note 2 at 25.
50 [hereinafter Nationality Convention].
51
Supra note 22 at 460.
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Article 4 of the Nationality Convention was believed to be a declaration of existing international law and a reflection of state practice, thus
forming a rule of customary international law. 52 The rule is reflected in
case law, including United States v. Great Britain (the Alexander case)
brought before the United States-British Claims Commission, and
United States v. Egypt (the Salem case) brought under a 1931 special
agreement between the two countries. 53 The Alexander case was a claim
for damages due to the occupation and injury ofreal property by United
States Yankee forces during the American Civil War. Mr. Alexander
was born in Kentucky of a Scottish father. The tribunal held that it had
no jurisdiction to hear the claim, resting its opinion on the proposition
that since he was a national of both countries, neither could represent
him in a claim against the other. The court reasoned that to pennit a
different outcome in such cases would inevitably lead to international
friction. 54
In the Salem case, the United States brought a claim for compensation for the treatment of Salem by the Egyptian authorities. Mr. Salem
was born in Egypt and was later naturalized in the United States. 55 In
this case the tribunal also endorsed the principle of sovereign equality,
noting that the practice of several governments is "that if two powers are
both entitled by international law to treat a person as their national,
neither of these powers can raise a claim against the other in the name of
such a person."56
52

Supra note 36 at 471. See also supra note 31 at 76:
Both the abstention of States from extending diplomatic protection on
behalf of their citizens against a State whose nationality the persons
concerned also possessed, and the determined opposition of States to
foreign interference with regard to the exercise of their jurisdiction over
their own citizens, have led to what was refen-ed to by the International
Court of Justice as "The ordinmy practice whereby a State does not
exercise protection on behalf of one of its nationals against a State which
regards him as its own national." [footnote: See Reparation for Injuries
Case, I C.J. Reports, 1949, p. 186. The frequent attempts of the United
States to extend diplomatic protection on behalf of naturali=ed citizens ...
should, thus, be considered as an exception to the ordinary practice of
States.]
53
Supra note 22 at 460.
54
Ibid. at 460-1.
55
Ibid. at 461.
56 Salem Case (Egypt v. United States) 1932, 2 R.l.A.A. 1161, excerpt reproduced in D.J.
Han-is, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5i1i ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998).
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The second approach to diplomatic protection and dual nationals is
that of dominant and effective nationality. The Canevaro case (Jtaly v.
Peru) brought before the Pennanent Court of Arbitration in 1912, is
frequently cited as the leading case on this approach. The case involved
a claim arising out of the Peruvian Government's non-payment of a
number of cheques issued by it in 1800 to the finn of Jose Canevaro and
Sons. The Tribunal held that although Rafael Canevaro was both a
national of Italy and Peru by operation of their respective nationality
laws, he was not entitled to an award. The panel investigated which
nationality he actually used, giving effect to his Peruvian nationality for
the purposes of diplomatic protection because that was his dominant
nationality, 57 particularly since he had run for Senate in Peru and had
accepted the office of Consul General for the Netherlands. Accordingly,
the tribunal concluded that the Peruvian Government was entitled to
consider him a Peruvian national and therefore refused to recognize his
Italian nationality for the purposes of having standing to bring a claim
on his behalf. The international tribunal could not adjudicate the matter
if Canevaro was a Peruvian national since the claim was then a matter
internal to Peru. 58 The dominant and effective approach to nationality
then involves a contextual analysis and detern1ination - the arbiter first
accepts that by operation of domestic laws the individual has multiple
nationalities and then privileges the dominant or effective nationality for
the purposes of the state-to-state dispute.
Arbitral tribunals and courts did not unifonnly apply either principle
in the earliest cases, but in the early 1900's the principle of state nonresponsibility or sovereign equality became entrenched as a rule of
international law. The 1955 decision of the International Comi of Justice
in Nottebohm 59 , however, gave renewed vigour to the rule of dominant
and effective nationality. In that case, Liechtenstein claimed, on behalf
of Friedrich Nottebohm, that the Government of Guatemala acted in
breach of their international obligations by an-esting, detaining, expel57
Leigh, ibid. This approach to dual nationality was also found in earlier cases, including
the 1834 Privy Council decision in Drummond's Case (P. Mahoney, "The Standing of Dual
Nationals Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", (1984) 24 Va. J. lnt'I L. 695 at
700).
58
Supra note 22 at 462. The decision is reprinted in G. Wilson, The Hague Arbitration
Cases (Littleton, Colorado: Rothman, 1990) at 238.
59 Supra note 30.
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ling and refusing to readmit Nottebohm and in exproriating his property
without compensation. These measures had been taken against him on
the grounds that he was an enemy alien.
Nottebohm was a German national by birth who had moved to
Guatemala where he carried on successful business activities. During
his years in Guatemala he went to Gennany numerous times and also
visited one of his brothers in Liechtenstein several times. In 1939,
shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War, Nottebohm applied
for naturalization by Liechtenstein, which was quickly granted after the
residency requirements were waived. He then returned to Guatemala
where he resumed his former business activities. 60
The International Court of Justice clearly endorsed the principle of
effective nationality in its decision, which found Liechtenstein's claim
on behalf of Nottebohm to be inadmissible 61 :
International arbitrators have decided in the same way numerous cases
of dual nationality, where the question arose with regard to the exercise of protection. They have given their preference to the real and
effective nationality, that which accorded with the facts, that based on
the stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of the
States whose nationality is involved. 62

In deciding whether Liechtenstein had standing to bring the claim,
the Court asked the question, "[a]t the time of his naturalization does
Nottebohm appear to have been more closely attached by his tradition,
his establishment, his interests, his activities, his family ties, his intentions for the near future to Liechtenstein than to any other State?" 63 The
Court held that whereas Nottebohm had a long-standing and close
connection with Guatemala, he had no such bond with Liechtenstein.
For this reason, Guatemala was under no obligation at international law
to recognize Liechtenstein's grant of nationality to Nottebohm or their
claim on his behalf. 64

Supra note 16 at 176-7.
Supra note 16, at 176.
62
Supra note 30 at 22. It should be noted that there was only one nationality at issue in this
case, that of Liechtenstein. Nonetheless, the principles articulated have been cited as applying
to dual nationals and the Comi itself refers here to cases of dual nationality.
63 Ibid. at 24.
64
Ibid. at 26.
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Subsequently, in the Merge Claim, decided by the United StatesItalian Conciliation Commission in 1955, 65 the Commission unanimously held that Mrs. Merge could not be considered to be dominantly a
United States national because her family did not have its habitual
residence or professional life established in the United States and rejected the petition of the Agent of the United States. 66 The Conm1ission
reached its decision by reviewing the Nationality Convention and the
decisions of international tribunals and legal literature, and concluding
that there was no irreconcilable opposition between the principle of
equality or state non-responsibility and that of dominant and effective
nationality. 67 The Commission suggested factual criteria for establishing effective nationality. In particular, they recognized that while habitual residence is an important criterion, the conduct of the individual
in her economic, social, political, civic and family life are also indicative
of her dominant and effective nationality. 68
Most recently, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal endorsed the
principle of dominant and effective nationality, relying heavily on the
Nottebohm decision. The case of Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat 69 was
brought by Nasser Esphahanian. He had Iranian nationality by birth but
after attending college and serving in the military in the United States,
became a naturalized U.S. citizen. 70 Esphahanian's employment took
him to the Middle-East in the 1970's at which time he conducted
transactions at the Iranian's Bank. A cheque from the bank was
dishonoured for insufficient funds and following efforts to receive payments from Iranian's Bank and its successor, Bank Tejarat, Esphahanian
filed a claim before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 71 The
65

22 I.LR. 443.
Supra note 16 at 182.
67
Ibid.
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Ibid. at 710-1.
69
Iranian Assets Litigation Rep. 6405 (April 15, 1983). The Full Tribunal endorsed
Chamber Two's decision in an opinion of April 6, 1984, Case No. A/18, Iranian Assets
Litigation Rep. 8258 (April 13, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 497. The Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal was established in 1981 with the goal of tenninating all litigation between the
two parties by deciding the "claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of
nationals of Iran against the United States" ("Note: Claims of Dual Nationals in the Modem
Era: The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal" (1984) 83 Mich. L. Rev. 597 [hereinafter
Claims]).
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Supra note 56 at 603.
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Ibid. at 603-604.
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Tribunal endorsed the principle of dominant and effective nationality.
The announcement of the decision was met with intense disapproval by
the Iranian representatives at the Hague; Iran's representative on the
panel refused to sign the opinion in Esphahanian and two companion
cases. 72
The Tribunal dismissed the rnle of state non-responsibility in the
Nationality Convention, stressing both the age of the Convention and
the limited number of signatories. 73 They further reasoned that most
disputes before the Tribunal involve private parties on one side and a
government or government-controlled entity on the other side. Further,
these disputes primarily address issues of municipal law and general
principles oflaw. In such cases it is the rights of the claimant and not the
nation that are at stake, thus the Tribunal concluded that "whatever the
state of the law prior to 1945, the better rnle at the time the Algiers
Declarations were concluded and today is the rnle of dominant and
effective nationality."74 The Tribunal concluded its analysis with the
following statement, clearly placing the issue of dual nationality within
the modem context of individual rights:
The trend toward modification of the Hague Convention rule ofnonresponsibility by [a] search for the dominant and effective nationality
is scarcely surprising as it is consistent with the contemporaneous
development of international law to accord legal protections to individuals, even against the State of which they are nationals. 75

1. Diplomatic and Consular Assistance to Dual Nationals:

In the context of these decisions by international tribunals, was the
Under-Secretary correct that Britain does not have an obligation at
international law of consular protection for dual nationals who are in the
country of their second nationality? In this section I will present four
possible arguments regarding the status and applicability of this supn Ibid. at 604.

Claims, supra note 68 at 622.
Supra note 56 at 602. The Algiers Declaration [Declaration of the Government of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algiers Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the
Government of the United States of America and the Govemment of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, initialed Jan. 19 1981, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 230 (1981)] established the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal.
75
Supra note 56 at 603.
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posed rule. It is my contention that, given the cumulative effects of the
evolving principles articulated in the arbitral precedents above, rules of
public international law, and the rise of human rights in the contemporary world of declining state sovereignty, the United Kingdom has
overstated the limitation they face as a result of the dual national status
of these victims.
First, one could consider whether the rule exists in customary international law. The content of this rule could be either "if consular
protection is sought by a person of dual nationality in the territ01y of the
other State which regards him as its national, such protection may only
be given either unofficially or in exceptional circumstances"76 or its
formulation in Article 4 of the Nationality Convention. To establish an
international custom, substantial uniformity of practice and opinio juris
are required. 77 State practice is the practice of the vast majority of states.
Opinio juris is the demonstration by states that a practice is required by
international law. 78 A new norm cannot emerge without both practice
and opinio juris; an existing nonn does not die without the great majority of states engaging in both contrary practice and indicating they do not
believe they are bound by the customary nonn. 79
Although a survey of state practice is difficult to conduct, it is
doubtful that sufficient uniform state practice exists to support the
existence of a norm of customary international law that states cannot
assist people who are dual nationals while they are in the state of their
other nationality. While British practice suggests that the custom exists,
United States and Canadian practice suggests that it does not. 80 The
Netherlands policy holds that Dutch diplomatic missions and consular
posts may try to assist Dutch nationals who have also the nationality of
the country where their interests have been damaged, although the
second state will generally give precedence to its own nation's interests.
Where such cases occur in the Netherlands, Dutch authorities will
likewise give precedence to Dutch citizenship. 81 Italy has extended
76
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R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford:
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assistance to individuals in other countries merely presumed to be dual
nationals (e.g. through surnames typical of Italy or due to the parents'
citizenship), citing human rights or humanitarian considerations as
prompting their involvement.82
Fmther, there is evidence of evolving state practice in special circumstances, such as child abduction, where states do offer diplomatic or
consular assistance to their nationals in a country of second nationality.
To this end, the Explanatory Report to the European Convention on
Nationality, noting that the general rule is contained in Article 4 of the
Nationality Convention, goes on to state:
... owing to the developments that have taken place in this area of
public international law since 1930, in exceptional individual circumstances and while respecting the rules of international law, a State
party may offer diplomatic or consular assistance or protection in
favour of one of its nationals who simultaneously possesses another
nationality, for example in cases of child abduction. 83

Abduction for the purposes of forced marriage, particularly in the
case of girls or young women, is a situation arguably equivalent or
analogous to child abduction and therefore this state practice is very
relevant
Thus it is uncertain whether the rule that a state cannot offer protection to one of its citizens who is in the state of their second nationality
has become customary international law. Furthermore, authors have
suggested that while Article 4 of the Nationality Convention was believed to codify existing law at the time, there is reason to believe that it
no longer represents the state of the law. 84 Paul Weis, for example, states
that:
[A1iicle 4 of the Nationality Convention] was considered as "well
established" in customary international law some time ago. It is,
however, doubtful whether this is still coITect today in view of the
practice of international tribunals to apply the concept of "effective
link", i.e., to assume jurisdiction where the link with the claimant State
is considered as the more effective as exemplified by the jurisprudence
of the Italian Conciliation Commissions. In assessing the practice of
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international tribunals a number of factors have, however, to be taken
into account such as the tenns of reference of the tribunal or whether it
is entitled to decide ex aequo et bono. Moreover, there is a difference
between protection by the institution ofjudicial or arbitral proceedings
and more infom1al methods of diplomatic protection. [footnotes omitted]85

A second approach to justifying the rule as binding on the U.K. is
through intemational treaty law with respect to Article 4 of the Nationality Convention. Ian Brownlie, a prominent international publicist, referred to the Nationality Convention as "a Convention of some interest,
though limited importance"86 , thus suggesting its diminished importance as a source of international treaty law. This Convention is seventy
years old, and much has changed in public intemational law and citizenship law in those intervening years. Furthermore, very few states ratified
or acceded to this treaty. 87 Unless the article represents customa1y
international law, the Convention's provisions create intemational law
that binds only the contracting states. 88 Although Great Britain and
Pakistan have each ratified or acceded to the Convention, 89 other law
would arguably govern Britain's relations with countries who are not
parties to the Convention.
A third approach is to consider the underlying justifications for this
"rule", of which there are three: avoidance of international conflict,
recognition of sovereign equality, and presumption of local remedy.
Arguably, all three justifications are somewhat anachronistic and oversimplifications of the complexity of international realities: whatever
merit they do hold, none applies to the case of a British-Asian woman
abducted for the purpose of a forced marriage.
First, as a result of a changed international system, the threat of
friction posed by dual nationals has diminished. 90 In the majority of
cases, an individual will have an manifestly stronger link with one of the
states than the other; it is therefore difficult to imagine substantial
85
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international friction arising if the dominant country were to assist their
national. 91 Moreover, the idea that a serious conflict would arise because someone helped an abducted woman return to her home seems
improbable. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the governments of
Bangladesh and Pakistan have not objected to interventions on behalf of
women and girls abducted for the purposes of forced marriage and they
have not expressed any pre-emptive opposition to fonnal interventions.
If international conflicts did arise from interventions by the state of
dominant nationality in cases of dual nationals whose human rights are
being violated, then this threat might be a valid justification for a rule to
limit such interventions. It is now generally accepted however - particularly in these forced marriage cases - that the issue here is one of
practical coordination, not of international security.
Secondly, respect for sovereign equality has traditionally included
the obligation to refrain from inte1fering in relations between another
state and its nationals. Sovereignty, however, can no longer be viewed
as an absolute concept, in particular given the rise of human rights and
supranational institutions. 92 It is suggested that such practices as the
refusal to allow expatriation and the acceptance ofjus sanguinis municipal laws which create dual nationality without regard for an individual's
connection to the state, are inconsistent with modem notions of human
rights and expressions of sovereignty. 93
In the forced marriage situation, respect for sovereign equality is
ostensibly inapplicable as both states have stated their opposition to
"honour crimes" and have assumed obligations under international human rights law to protect the rights of women (especially under the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women). Assisting a victim of forced marriage to escape is consistent
with the human rights obligations of both countries and therefore consistent with contemporary notions of a sovereign state's responsibilities.
Furthennore, there is a fundamental distinction to be drawn between
interfering with a state's direct treatment of one of its nationals according to local law and custom, and protecting a person from abuse by a
non-state actor. Aliicle 4 addresses the former, where the intervention is
91
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against the other country of nationality. In this situation, the state may
be responsible for not protecting the women but it is not the state that is
confining her or forcing her into the marriage. The sovereign equality
justification of refraining from interference in the relations between a
state and its national loses much of its weight given that the abuses are
committed by a private party and not officially condoned by the government; the intervention, therefore, is not against the state but an attempt
to work with that state or in the place of that state where they are
unwilling or unable to act.
Based on the apparent inapplicability of these two underlying justifications for the rule, it would seem that Article 5 of the Nationality
Convention would be more relevant to the factual concerns in cases of
forced marriage than is Article 4, referred to by the British authorities.
Aliicle 5 relates to the status in a third country of a person having more
than one nationality, stating that the person should be treated as if they
only had one. 94 Notably, in a third state there is no concern for international friction and sovereign equality and therefore no need to restrict a
foreign state from intervening on behalf of its national. The logic of
Article 5 corresponds to the need for a practical ordering of responsibilities and privileges between states while protecting the rights and interests of persons who find themselves in difficult situations while outside
their home country. I would argue, therefore, that if this rule limiting the
ability of a state to assist its national while they are in their second
country of nationality ever did apply in this type of situation, surely it no
longer does. The reason for the rule no longer exists, other rules exist
which more accurately reflect the underlying concerns in this situation,
and moreover, the states have more recently adopted human rights
obligations that are in opposition to the supposed rule.
Finally, the assumption of the local remedies doctrine, which presumes that the claimant has an opportunity for redress within his or her
own country and should not have the protection of two countries,
ignores the reality of the claims processes and the availability of domestic assistance in some countries. 95 While both Pakistan and Bangladesh
have constitutional, human rights, criminal and civil law remedies relevant to forced marriage cases, the lack of implementation of the domes94
95
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tic law is a major obstacle to effective redress. 96 There appear to have
been few if any prosecutions against those responsible for forced or
threatened forced maniages. In fact, some of the victims' families have
filed false charges of kidnapping, abduction and even rape in the event
of marriages genuinely consented to by these same women, evidently to
prevent them from marrying the people they truly want to marry rather
than those their families want them to marry. This demonstrates that the
legal system has been used to further victimize rather than provide a
remedy for the violence that these women have suffered. Women's
access to justice, the incapacity of the law enforcement machinery,
discriminatory personal laws, gender biases in judicial decision-making
and resource limitations all severely limit the availability of local remedies to British-Asian abductees, making the assumption of a local
re1nedy erroneous. 97
The presumption of a local remedy seems particularly inappropriate
in the situation of abductions and forced marriages. If the United Kingdom cannot or will not assist the abducted women, and if the authorities
in Pakistan or Bangladesh do not assist as is generally the case, 98 the
women are effectively left without any foimal remedy. As discussed
above, protection is a hallmark of citizenship. Refusing consular assistance is comparable to denying their British citizenship, designating
them as non-citizens outside the circle of British membership. 99 If the
country in which they are physically present (their other country of
nationality) does not help them either, the result is comparable to being
stateless, a unifonnly accepted undesirable status. The interaction of the
domestic citizenship laws which create dual citizen status with the
international law rules on diplomatic protection in effect convert them
96
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from members of two communities to "de facto stateless" people or
members of no community. Surely this is not the result intended by
international law.
Finally, in considering the ambiguous nature of the possible rule
preventing the U.K. from actively intervening on behalf of abducted
British-Asians, the values and conditions of the contemporary, postnational, human rights dominated international system are vital. The
following comment from an article published in 1949 on the legal
effects of dual nationality is telling:
If the time should come, through the operation of an International Bill
of Rights or othetwise, that the right of fair treatment is regarded as the
right of an individual and not merely the right of a state with which he
is connected, the law as to dual nationality would undergo a striking
change. 100

Arguably, this time has come. The rights of individuals are protected
in national constitutions, domestic legislation, and regional and international human rights agreements. Individuals can bring their own claims
in order to vindicate their rights in both national courts and at the
international level. 101
Once it is recognized that obligations are owed directly to individuals (rather than just to states) it is not possible to regard the treatment of
a state's nationals as falling exclusively within domestic jurisdiction,
rendering it unreviewable by the international c01m11unity. 101 Nationality and protection are no longer viewed as exclusively within the reserved state domain. Fmihen11ore, protection is no longer merely a
100
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function of nationality. Rather, it falls under the umbrella of human
rights, which requires that the international community protect the
abused regardless of their nationality. 103 The United Kingdom,
Bangladesh and Pakistan have assumed obligations under law to protect
women subjected to the threat or act of forced marriage. 104 Furthennore,
such cases implicate erga omnes obligations to uphold the rights to life,
freedom from arbitrary detention and freedom from slavery, thus requiring the state to protect any person who is a victim of forced marriage.
The principle of dominant and effective nationality corresponds
with modem principles of human rights since it ensures that a State can
bring a claim on behalf of a national effectively connected with it, even
if the claim is against a state of which the person is formally a national.
This principle allows claims to be brought that would be barred by the
sovereign equality principle. 105
Individuals who find themselves tied to two nations, often involuntarily, must not be deprived of their only oppo1tunity for justice.
Refusal to extend protection to these dual nationals is inconsistent with
contempora1y attempts to provide a minimum standard of protection
for the human rights of individuals, irrespective of nationality. 106

It should be emphasized that the principle of effective nationality
need not apply only to standing before international comis and arbitration tribunals, but also to the provision of basic consular and diplomatic
assistance. States could use the effective nationality principle to decide
whether to intervene on behalf of a dual national. If the individual has
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stronger ties to the other state then intervention may not be justified. 107
When approached by friends of an abducted dual national for assistance,
rather than immediately cautioning that officially the U.K. cannot intervene, the British officials should engage in a factual review of the
woman's connection to Britain and to the country where she is being
held (e.g. her residence, friends, school, work, language, etc.) in order to
detennine whether intervention is warranted based on her active or
dominant nationality.
The growing acceptance of dual nationality and the rise of human
rights is contributing to a redefinition of citizenship itself. The traditional dichotomy between citizens and aliens, whereby citizens are seen
as having all rights of membership while non-citizens have none, no
longer represents reality. 108 Human rights do not depend on nationality
and can therefore be perceived of as challenging state sovereignty and
devaluing or redefining citizenship in the process. 109 These trends suggest that notions of exclusivity in citizenship are declining, while citizenship is being reconceptualized as "a vehicle to facilitate ci vie participation and layered community identifications rather than an indication
of jealous fealties. "" 0
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VI. SOME OBSERVATIONS
When I began researching this issue, I was struck by the fact that
while domestic laws, international rules of diplomatic intervention and
international human rights law were implicated in any legal solution to·
this problem, the interactions between these bodies of law seemed to be
poorly understood. I was unable to find any authorities on the order of
priority when these bodies conflicted or analysis of how these bodies of
law should be interpreted and applied with respect to their interrelationship. It seemed that each existed on an independent plane. However
when faced with the facts of a specific girl or woman who had been
abducted, taken to a foreign country, held against her will, emotionally
and maybe physically or sexually abused, possibly forced into physical
labour, forced into a marriage to which she did not consent and desperately attempting to get back to her home in the United Kingdom it was
clear to me that these bodies of law did not exist independent of each
other but were intimately related. Their interaction was in fact causing a
tragic legal bottle-neck, where women who so obviously deserved assistance were suffering. Because of their legally defined membership in
two communities these women found themselves without the protection
or assistance of any community.
I was also struck by the tensions and uncertainly inherent in our
rapidly globalizing world. The U.K. referred to rules of international law
articulated in a different era, yet the international legal tradition gave
some credence to these counter-intuitive principles. While human rights
principles are at the forefront of international law and international
relations, state sovereignty remains the qedrock principle of the rules
organizing interactions between states. I could see the complexity of this
evolution in the scholarly writings that I consulted and in the seemingly
unresolvable conflicting imperatives.
I was also intrigued at how an international legal order based on
sovereign equality and one based on an individual rights regime could
be seen as complementary rather than in complete opposition to one
another and how different bodies of law were in fact influencing each
other and evolving together. The doctrine of dominant and effective
nationality in international claims, for example, is constructing our
understanding of citizenship while also complementing the evolving
human rights jurisprudence on nationality. The international abduction
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and forced marriage scenario is interesting as a legal study specifically

because the dilemma is situated at the cusp of these complex, interacting
forces.
It should be clear from my legal analysis that I believe, as the
Working Group argued, that the United Kingdom is not restricted by
international rules from attempting to formally assist abducted women.
The U.K. is under a duty to at least attempt, in cooperation with South
Asian governments, to prevent abductions and forced marriages. When
they do occur, the U.K. must offer whatever assistance is possible to the
victim. I would caution, however, that this is one small piece in a
complex puzzle and that the "solution" certainly does not end here. The
rise of forced maniages brings to the fore questions of international and
inter-community relations, gender and power, consent and family roles.
Addressing forced marriage implicates issues much broader that diplomatic assistance, as discussed in this paper, although diplomatic assistance is essential in desperate cases and is in many ways a starting-point
for developing a comprehensive approach to the problem.
Finally, I feel it is very important in a study such as this to address
the cultural aspects of the issues raised and the politics of cross-cultural
cooperation and intervention. As stated at the outset of this paper, the
issue is abduction and forced marriage, not arranged marriage. As such,
criticisms of cultural insensitivity are less applicable. Few South Asian
or British-South Asian women would assert that abduction and forced
marriage are an integral part of their culture. In fact the impetus behind
the U.K. action to examine the issue of forced marriages by striking the
working group came from within the British-South Asian community.
That, however, does not mean that culture is not central to this question
since undoubtedly concerns about offending the British-Asian community fueled the British government's reluctance to get involved in this
issue. Further, misunderstandings about cultural practices and the distinction between arranged and forced marriages have probably increased
this reluctance. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that community
leaders and abductors when accused of violating basic human rights
have used cultural misunderstanding as a defense. Culture and human
rights, particularly in the context of Asia, are "hot topics" and must be
central to any strategies adopted by the British government.
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In her paper "Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate
in Context" 111 , Karen Engles discusses the many uses of the word
"culture" in human rights debates. She explains how "Asian values"
proponents use culture both to assert an exception or opposition to a
certain type of human rights and to argue that human rights should
protect their culture. In the forced marriage context, such an argument
would state, first, that freedom to consent to marriage, the right to
personal security and the other implicated human rights discussed
above, do not apply or should be interpreted differently with respect to
South Asian culture. Second, it could state that human rights law should
protect Asian culture, assimilating forced marriages with arranged marriages as expressions of Asian culture. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to enter into the "Asian values" debate or cultural relativism
versus universalism, but I believe it is fair to state that providing basic
consular services to abducted women seeking such services can be
examined without entering into these important debates.

VII. CONCLUSION
Citizenship is not a theoretical interest; as an abducted girl or woman
desperately attempts to escape detention in a foreign land where she is
threatened with an unwanted (and often surprise) marriage, her national
membership has very palpable personal meaning. Her status as a dual
national, which she may not have chosen or of which she may not have
even been aware, can assume critical importance in her life.
In this paper I have reviewed dual nationality: why it occurs, how it
is perceived, and how it can be a desirable phenomenon, reflecting
contemporary meanings of citizenship and the layered identities of an
increasing number of immigrants and internationally mobile persons. I
have explored the international rule preventing a state from intervening
on behalf of one of its nationals against a state of which he or she is also
a national. Arbitral decisions, state practice, and transformed conceptions of sovereignty and human rights all point to the need to modify this
rule, if it in fact still exists and applies to this situation. When considered
111
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as a whole, what becomes clear is that the meaning of citizenship, the
idea of rights, domestic legislation and international custom interact and
evolve together.
INTERIGHTS, ASK and Shirkat Gah submitted their report and
recommendations to the Home Office Working Group on Forced Marriages and continue to work on finding solutions. Based on its public
consultations, the Working Group produced a report entitled "A Choice
By Right" in June 2000 which gives an overview of forced marriages in
the U.K. and sets out a framework for tackling the issue. 112 The Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Home Office responded with a
"Joint Action Plan" in August 2000, which adopts, at least in pali, some
of the rec01m11endations put forward in the submission and reflects some
of the arguments put forth in this paper. 113 The process of consultation,
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"A Choice by Right: The Repo1t of the Working Group on Forced Marriage", online:
Foreign & Commonwealth Office <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/reu/forced.htm> (date accessed: 31 August 2001).
113
"Action Plan on Forced Marriages - The Overseas Dimension", online: Foreign &
Commonwealth Office <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newtext.asp?4048> (date accessed: 31
August 2001). This joint action plan addresses ten areas where action can be taken, including
ensuring that victims know where to tum, helping victims get access to legal remedies and
building partnerships with non-govenunental organizations, women's groups, lawyers, religious leaders, etc. who share the aim of preventing forced marriages and assisting the victims.
On the issue of dual nationality, it states:
Dual nationality is an immutable fact of international law, and we cannot unilaterally
ignore it. Under some countries law British nationals of that descent are counted as nationals
of those countries whether they like it or not, and even whether they know about it or not.
We will:
7.1. Issue clear revised guidance on dual nationality, that makes clear that
helping dual nationals who are the victims of forced marriage is not a
seconda1y or infonnal task, but a key and fonnal objective. The guidance
should make clear the legal limitations that dual nationality imposes on
helping forced marriage victims, but emphasise that the objective should
be to do as much as possible despite these limitations. And the same
message should be in all our letters and publications.
7.2. Adopt strategy of assuming right of consular protection tmtil proven
othe1wise. If necessmy, remind the local authorities forcefully that forcing
someone into marriage is illegal under their law.
7.3. Explore definition of dual nationals not habitually resident in-counhy, and therefore with a right to UK consular protection. Test it out in
suitable cases, and explain legal basis to the local authorities if challenged.
7.4. Where dual nationality is an impediment we should treat the problem
as a human rights issue. Under various human rights instrnments, the UK
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legal argumentation and creative vision continues. 114 Communities in
Canada and around the world struggling with similar situations will be
able to learn from the experience of the British initiative. Hopefully the
state of the law on the subject will be both clarified and advanced by the
efforts of the Working Group, and the lawyers, community leaders and
activists who have united to address this issue.
This study demonstrates that law can not be understood as a set of
rules, cordoned off into categories and providing us with standards of
action. Law is contested, it is contradictory and it is in flux. Bodies of
law interact and conflict. Through legal theory and practice we challenge our understanding of what we do on a daily basis and what goes on
in the world around us. We struggle with meaning, constructing and
reconstructing the social sphere. The problem of forced marriages is
very real and cannot be addressed by simply stating the correct rule. It is
a complex situation involving power and gender, culture and politics. As
such, the law and theory of citizenship and diplomatic protection are
best understood as sites of a struggle over meaning, and as endeavors to
understand and redefine international relations and human rights.

has a locus to raise breaches with the local authotities where it knows such
breaches are taking place.
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